Volume 23

Issue 5

Article 5

1977

Constitutional Law - Obscenity - 1977 Amendments to the
Pennsylvania Obscenity Statute
John P. Kopesky

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the First Amendment Commons

Recommended Citation
John P. Kopesky, Constitutional Law - Obscenity - 1977 Amendments to the Pennsylvania Obscenity
Statute, 23 Vill. L. Rev. 1137 (1977).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol23/iss5/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository.

Kopesky: Constitutional Law - Obscenity - 1977 Amendments to the Pennsylva

1977-1978]

Recent Developments
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
PENNSYLVANIA

-

OBSCENITY -

1977

AMENDMENTS TO THE

OBSCENITY STATUTE.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Justice Stewart recognized the difficulties associated with the problem
of defining obscenity in his concurrence in Jacobellis v. Ohio,' where he
wrote:
[U]nder the First and Fourteenth Amendments criminal laws in this area
are constitutionally limited to hard-core pornography. I shall not today
attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be
embraced within that shorthand definition; and perhaps I could never
succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it ....
Acknowledging the need for more precise standards, the United States
Supreme Court in 1973 enunciated what purported to be "concrete
guidelines ' 3 for the identification of obscene materials in Miller v.
California.4 Pursuant thereto, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
Pennsylvania's obscenity statute5 unconstitutional in 1975,6 and the
7
legislature responded with a series of amendments to that statute in 1977.
The result is a wide-ranging prohibition on the exhibition and distribution of
obscene materials to both minors and adults.8 While a number of technical
improvements have been made in the statute,9 these amendments have
failed to provide a precise definition which would foster predictable and
evenhanded enforcement of the state's obscenity statute. 10
This note will evaluate whether the amendments to the Pennsylvania
obscenity law meet with the current constitutional standards governing the
regulation of sexually explicit materials. The efficacy of the current
standards will also be considered.

1. 378 U.S.
infra.
2. 378 U.S.
3. Miller v.
4. 413 U.S.

184 (1964). For a further discussion of Jacobellis, see notes 22 & 60
at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
California, 413 U.S. 15, 29 (19Y3).
15 (1973). For a further discussion of Miller, see notes 12-29 and

accompanying text infra.
5. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903 (Purdon 1973). For a further discussion of this

statute and the text of its major sections, see notes 30-32 & 38 and accompanying text
infra.

6. Commonwealth v. McDonald, 464 Pa. 435, 347 A.2d 290 (1975), cert. denied,

429 U.S. 816 (1976). For a further discussion of McDonald, see notes 33-39 and
accompanying text infra.
7. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §5903 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
8. See note 44 infra.

9. See notes 64-75 & 95-96 and accompanying text infra.
10. See notes 79-83 and accompanying text infra.
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Miller v. California
A. Obscenity and the Supreme Court: Miller
and its Heritage
The standard for determining whether sexually explicit material is
obscene has long been the subject of debate and confusion among the
Justices of the United States Supreme Court. 1 In 1973, the Court decided
Miller v. California,12 and announced a new standard for determining
whether speech is obscene or entitled to protection under the first and
fourteenth amendments. 13 The standards established in Miller remain14the
Court's latest pronouncement on the "intractable obscenity problem."'
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority in Miller,15 reaffirmed the
position that obscene material is unprotected by the first amendment. 6 This
11. This comment will not attempt a full discussion of the history of the Supreme
II.

OBSCENITY REGULATION: THE IMPACT OF

Court's struggle to define constitutionally suppressible obscenity, as others have
already addressed this definitional problem. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49, 78-83 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY
30-48, 69-166 (1976); Lockhart, Escape From the Chill of Uncertainty:Explicit Sex
and the First Amendment, 9 GA. L. REV. 533, 537-57 (1975).
12. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Appellant Miller was convicted of knowingly distributing
obscene matter, based on his unsolicited sending of five sexually explicit advertising
brochures through the mail. Id. at 16-18. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the
majority, characterized the case as involving "the application of a State's criminal
obscenity statute to a situation in which sexually explicit materials have been thrust
by aggressive sales action upon unwilling recipients who had in no way indicated any
desire to receive such materials." Id. at 18. Miller was thus factually distinguishable
from the majority of obscenity cases in that it did not involve the sale or exhibition of
sexually explicit materials to a "willing" buyer. SCHAUER, supra note 11, at 45-46.
The Court, however, declined to deal with the facts in Miller on these narrow grounds.
Id. at 46.
13. 413 U.S. at 23. See notes 15-27 and accompanying text infra.
14. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
15. 413 U.S. at 16. Joining Chief Justice Burger in the majority were Justices
White, Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist. Id. Majority opinions in obscenity cases are
exceedingly rare. The Miller case was the first time that the Court has been able to
muster a majority on the issue of defining obscenity since Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476 (1957). See, e.g., Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 770-71 (1967) (per curiam
opinion noting the multiplicity of views); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413
(1966) (five separate opinions); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) (six separate
opinions). See also Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704-05 & n.1 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The severity of the split of opinion among the Justices, and the resulting
inability to agree on a uniform rationale for their decisions, was demonstrated in
Redrup and its progeny. In Redrup, the Court reviewed three state cases dealing with
obscene publications and, in a short per curiam opinion, noted the different views of
its members regarding the proper test for determining obscenity and the scope of
obscenity regulation. 386 U.S. at 771. The conclusion of the Court was merely an
acknowledgement of their divergence: "Whichever of these constitutional views is
brought to bear upon the cases before us, it is clear that the judgments cannot stand."
Id. The Court then embarked upon a six year policy of issuing summary reversals,
without opinion, of any conviction relating to materials which at least five Justices,
each applying his own test, found to be protected by the first amendment. SCHAUER,
supra note 11, at 44. The Court decided an additional 28 cases in this fashion between
1967 and 1973. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 82 n.8 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). The nature of the sexually explicit materials involved in these cases was
summarized by Judge Leventhal in Huffman v. United States, 470 F.2d 386, 393-402
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
16. 413 U.S. at 23.
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concept was first enunciated in Roth v. United States,17 in which the Court
applied an obscenity theory which divided speech into protected and
unprotected categories, with regulation of only the former examined in the
light of first amendment considerations.' 8
Denying obscene materials first amendment protection shifts the
primary focus in this area to the definition of obscenity. The Miller Court
reaffirmed the test first enunciated in Roth's for making this determination,
holding that a work is obscene if "'the average person, applying

17. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
18. Id. at 484-85. The Court held that obscenity, although expression, falls
outside the area of constitutionally protected speech under the first and fourteenth
amendments. Id. at 485. Justice Brennan, writing for a majority of five of the Justices,
stated that there was no incompatibility between antiobscenity laws and the
constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press because obscenity was within a
class of "utterances" which historically have not been considered as falling within the
protection of the first amendment. Id. at 484-85. See Kalven, The Metaphysics of the
Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 9-12 (1960). Justice Brennan wrote:
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance ... have
the full protection of the [first amendment] guarantees, unless excludable
because they encroach upon the limited area of more important interests. But
implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as
utterly without redeeming social importance.
354 U.S. at 484 (footnote omitted). This bi-level theory of the first amendment, which
entirely excludes certain utterances from first amendment protection, is derived from
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568 (1942), which excluded libel and "fighting words," respectively, from the
scope of first amendment protection. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF

486-95 (1970); Monaghan, Obscenity 1966: The Marriage of Obscenity
Per Se and Obscenity Per Quod, 76 YALE L.J. 127, 131 (1966).
A number of commentators have considered it noteworthy that the Roth Court
employed this bi-level analysis rather than require the government to justify
obscenity regulation in traditional first amendment terms. See, e.g., Comment,
Stanley v. Georgia: New Directions in Obscenity Regulation?, 48 TEXAS L. REV. 646,
647-48 (1970); Note, More Ado About Dirty Books, 75 YALE L.J. 1364, 1365-66 (1966).
Pursuant to traditional first amendment tests, regulation of speech is justified only
because of the dangers posed by the consequences of the speech; speech itself is not
EXPRESSION

considered to be the evil. See T. EMERSON, TOWARD

A

GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST

AMENDMENT 50-58 (1963). It has been suggested that the bi-level theory was used in
Roth because of the improbability of the government establishing that the
consequences of obscenity, in terms of antisocial conduct or more general injury to
society, were so imminent or significant as to support proscription or regulation under
any previous formula. See Kalven, supra, at 9-12; Monaghan, supra, at 130-31. Cf.
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY (Sup. Doc. No.
Y30B7:1/970) (1970) (finding little or no serious harm resulting from the availability
of sexually explicit materials) [hereinafter cited as REPORT]. For a further discussion
of the Commission, its findings, and its recommendations, see note 44 infra. A
number of lower courts had expressed similar doubts prior to Roth. See United States
v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 812-17 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring), aff'd, 354 U.S. 476
(1957); Esquire v. Walker, 151 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1945), aff'd sub nom. Hannegan v.
Esquire, 327 U.S. 146 (1946); Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 D. & C. 101, aff'd sub nom.
Commonwealth v. Feigenbaum, 166 Pa. Super. Ct. 120, 70 A.2d 389 (1949).
While the bi-level theory of speech survives in obscenity cases, it has been
disregarded in other areas. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (libel);
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (fighting words); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (libel); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967)
(libel); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (libel).
19. 413 U.S. at 23. See notes 17 & 18 supra.
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contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest." 20
The Miller Court, however, supplemented the Roth formulation with two
further requirements. First, material was to be considered obscene only if it
"depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law."'21 This element reflected the
requirement first enunciated in Manual Enterprises v. Day 22 that the
material be patently offensive, and added a due process safeguard that the
controlling statute specifically state the type of depiction considered
unlawful. 23 The second addition of the Miller Court, and the one that

20. 413 U.S. at 24, quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957). This
definition was far more important for what it rejected than for what it included. Its
purpose was to reject the rule of Regina v. Hicklin, 3 Q.B. 360 (1868), which evaluated
works on the basis of the likely effect of isolated sections of the work upon the most
susceptible persons in the community. According to the Roth Court, the Hicklin rule
had at one time achieved a significant degree of acceptance in the United States. 354
U.S. at 488-89 & n.25. See generally SCHAUER, supra note 11, at 7-8 & 15-29.
21. 413 U.S. at 24.
22. 370 U.S. 478 (1962). Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Harlan in a plurality
opinion, held that although the Roth test required an appeal to prurient interest, such
an appeal must be present in a patently offensive way for the material to be obscene.
Id. at 486-88 (plurality opinion).
The permissible scope of regulation was narrowed toward a "hard core
pornography only" test in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964). SCHAUER, supra
note 11, at 42. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Goldberg, noted that obscenity was
outside of the range of first amendment protection because it was "utterly without
redeeming social importance" but that "material dealing with sex in a manner that
advocates ideas, or has literary or scientific value or any other form of social
importance, may not be branded as obscenity and denied the constitutional
protection." 378 U.S. at 191 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
The Court thus held that the material must go "substantially beyond customary
limits of candor in description or representation of such matters." Id. at 191 (plurality
opinion). For Justice Stewart's conclusion in Jacobellis,see text accompanying note 2
supra. For a comment on the value of the hard core pronography test, see Murphy,
The Value of Pornography, 10 WAYNE L. REV. 655, 688 (1964).
23. 413 U.S. at 24-25. The Miller Court held that the permissible scope of
obscenity regulation was confined to works which depict or describe sexual conduct,
and that the "conduct must be specifically defined by the applicable state law, as
written or authoritatively construed." Id. at 24 (footnote omitted). Chief Justice Burger
then suggested some specific definitions:
We emphasize that it is not our function to propose regulatory schemes for
the States. That must await their concrete legislative efforts. It is possible,
however, to give a few plain examples of what a state statute could define for
regulation under . . .the standard announced in this opinion .. :
(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual
acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated.
(b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation,
excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals.
Id. at 25. See also United States v. Twelve 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 130 n.7
(1973). The practical effect of this portion of the standard is to exclude all but hard
core pornography from the obscenity classification. 413 U.S. at 27.
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represented the most significant departure from prior law, was that the
material was to be considered obscene if "the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. ''2 4 This test specifically
replaced the "utterly without redeeming social value" test of Memoirs v.
Massachusetts, 25 which Chief Justice Burger had criticized as "veer(ing)
sharply away from the Roth concept" 26 and placing an almost insurmountable burden on the prosecutor in an obscenity action. 27 The Miller Court thus

24. 413 U.S. at 24.
25. 383 U.S. 413 (1966). In Memoirs, a three Justice plurality, attempting to
restate the Roth test as it had been interpreted by subsequent cases, expressed the
view that federal or state governments could control the distribution of materials only
where:
three elements ... coalesce: it must be established that (a) the dominant theme
of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the
material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community
standards relating to the depiction or representation of sexual matters; and (c)
the material is utterly without redeeming social value.
Id. at 418 (plurality opinion).
The Memoirs plurality consisted of Justices Brennan and Fortas, and Chief
Justice Warren. 383 U.S. at 413. Justices Black and Douglas concurred on broader
grounds in reversing the judgment. 383 U.S. at 421 (Black, J., concurring); 383 U.S. at
424 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Stewart also concurred in the judgment, based
on his view that only "hard-core pronography" may be suppressed. 383 U.S. at 421
(Stewart, J., concurring). See Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 499 (1966)
(Stewart, J., concurring). Thus, "[tihe view of the Memoirs plurality therefore
constituted the holding of the Court and provided the governing standards." Marks v.
United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193-94 (1977).
26. 413 U.S. at 21.
27. Id. at 21-22. The Chief Justice wrote:
While Roth presumed "obscenity" to be "utterly without redeeming social
importance," Memoirs required that to prove obscenity it must be affirmatively
established that the material is "utterly without redeeming social value." Thus,
even as they repeated the words of Roth, the Memoirs plurality produced a
drastically altered test that called on the prosecution to prove a negative, i.e.,
that the material was "utterly without redeeming social value" - a burden
virtually impossible to discharge under our criminal standards of proof.
Id. (emphasis supplied by the Court). The Memoirs test paved the way for six years of
extremely minimal regulation of obscenity. SCHAUER, supra note 11, at 42. Opponents
of censorship hailed the Memoirs decision as a conclusive victory. Oglesby, Porno
Non Est Pro Bono Publico: Obscenity as a Public Nuisance in California,4 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 385, 388 (1977). See also C. REMBAR, THE END OF OBSCENITY 484-89
(1968). In the years following Memoirs obscenity convictions were few, and many
were reversed because the material had some slight degree of arguable social value.
SCHAUER, supra note 11, at 43. See, e.g., United States v. A Motion Picture Entitled "I
Am Curious Yellow," 404 F.2d 196, 200 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. One Carton
Positive Motion Picture Film Entitled "491," 367 F.2d 889 (2d Cir. 1966); Attorney
General v. A Book Named "Naked Lunch," 351 Mass. 298, 218 N.E.2d 571 (1966);
Commonwealth v. Dell Publications, Inc., 427 Pa. 189, 233 A.2d 840 (1967);
Commonwealth v. Baer, 209 Pa. Super. Ct. 349, 227 A.2d 915 (1967).
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clearly departed from the standards of previous decisions 28 in promulgating
the tripartite test for the determination of obscenity.2 9
B.

The Pennsylvania Judiciary'sResponse to
Miller v. California

At the time Miller was decided obscenity regulation in Pennsylvania
was governed by section 5903 of the Crimes Code. 3° Section 5903(a)
prohibited the distribution of obscene materials to adults,31 and section
28. SCHAUER, supra note 11, at 47. The question of the extent to which the Miller
standards were "new" generated a substantial amount of litigation to determine
whether the decision would have retroactive application, or whether offenses
committed prior to Miller could even be prosecuted in light of the Miller language
arguably suggesting that prior standards were unduly vague. 413 U.S. at 22 & n.3. In
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974), the Court held that the change was not
so major as to provide a lack of notice defense for pre-Miller conduct. Id. at 115-17.
The Court held that the due process clause of the fifth amendment precluded
retroactive application of the Miller standards to the extent that those standards may
impose criminal liability for conduct not punishable under the standards announced
in Memoirs. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 196 (1977). The Marks Court held
that defendants are entitled to jury instructions requiring acquittal unless the jury
finds the materials to be "utterly without redeeming social value." Id. The Court
simultaneously held that any constitutional principle announced in Miller that would
serve to benefit defendants must be applied in their case. Id. at 196-97.
29. 413 U.S. at 24. Chief Justice Burger summarized this tripartite test as follows:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the average
person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the work,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest .. ; (b) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.

Id.
On the same day that Miller was decided, the Court handed down decisions in
four other obscenity cases which expanded the applicability of the Miller standard.
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (Miller standard applicable to
dissemination to consenting adults); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973) (Miller
standard applicable to printed verbal descriptions of sexual activity, even though
devoid of any pictures); United States v. Twelve 200-Ft. Reels, 413 U.S. 123 (1973)
(Miller standard applicable to importation for an importer's private use); United
States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973) (Miller standard applicable to private interstate
transportation of films).
30. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903 (Purdon 1973).
31. Id. § 5903(a). Section 5903(a) provided:
Whoever sells, lends, distributes, exhibits, gives away or shows to any person
17 years of age or older or offers to sell, lend, distribute, exhibit or give away or
show, or has in his possession with intent to sell, lend, distribute or give away or
to show to any person 17 years of age or older, or knowingly advertises in any
manner any obscene literature, book, magazine, pamphlet, storypaper, paper,
comic book, writing, drawing, photograph, figure or image, or any written or
printed matter of an obscene nature, or any article or instrument of an obscene
nature, or whoever designs, copies, draws, photographs, prints, utters, publishes
or in any manner manufactures or prepares any such book, picture, drawing,
magazine, pamphlet, newspaper, storypaper, paper, comic book, writing, figure,
image, matter, article or thing or whoever writes, prints, publishes or utters or
causes to be printed, published or uttered, any advertisement or notice of any
kind giving information, directly or indirectly, stating or purporting to state
where, how, or whom or by what means any obscene book, picture, writing,
paper, comic book, figure, image, matter, article or thing named in this section
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5903(b) defined "obscene" as "that which, to the average person applying
contemporary community standards, has as its dominant theme, taken as a
'3 2
whole, an appeal to prurient interest.
In Commonwealth v. McDonald,3 3 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
examined section 5903 in light of the standards established in Miller and
concluded that the definition of obscenity set forth in section 5903(b) was
unconstitutionally vague and contrary to the definitional requirements of
obscenity established by the United States Supreme Court.34 The court held
that section 5903(b) failed to define with requisite specificity the types of
35
sexual conduct whose depiction or description the statute ought to regulate.
Rejecting the State's suggestion that the term "obscene" as used in section
5903(b) be construed to include the "examples" of obscene materials
provided by the Miller Court, 36 the McDonald court concluded that section

can be purchased, obtained or had, or whoever hires, employs, uses or permits
any minor or child to do or assist in doing any act or thing mentioned in this
section, is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree.
Id. Section 5903 contains separate provisions concerning the distribution of obscene
materials to minors. Id. § 5903(c)-(e).
32. Id. § 5903(b). The definition of obscenity in section 5903(b) is taken directly
from the test established by the United States Supreme Court in Roth. See notes 17-20
and accompanying text supra. This section was not subjected to judicial review until
1975. Commonwealth v. McDonald, 464 Pa. 435, 347 A.2d 290 (1975), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 816 (1976). For a further discussion of McDonald, see notes 33-39 and
accompanying text infra. Language identical to that in section 5903(b) was construed
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in two earlier cases. See Commonwealth v.
LaLonde, 447 Pa. 364, 368 n.4, 288 A.2d 782, 784 n.4 (1972); Commonwealth v. Dell
Publications, Inc., 427 Pa. 189, 198-99, 233 A.2d 840, 846 (1967) (adopting the Memoirs
test of "utterly without redeeming social value" as the controlling standard for
obscenity regulation in Pennsylvania). For a discussion of the Memoirs test, see note
25 and accompanying text supra.
33. 464 Pa. 435, 347 A.2d 290 (1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
34. 464 Pa. at 443, 347 A.2d at 295.
35. Id. at 452, 347 A.2d at 299. For a discussion of the specific definition
requirement of Miller, see note 23 and accompanying text supra.
36. 464 Pa. at 449-50, 347 A.2d at 298-99. See note 23 supra.This approach has
been adopted by a number of jurisdictions. See, e.g., Pierce v. State, 292 Ala. 473, 296
So. 2d 218 (1974); Gibbs v. State, 255 Ark. 997, 504 S.W.2d 719 (1974); Rhodes v. State,
283 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1973) (prospective application only); People v. Ridens, 59 Ill.
2d
362, 321 N.E.2d 264 (1974); Mangum v. Maryland State Bd. of Censors, 273 Md. 176,
328 A.2d 283 (1974); State v. Welke, 298 Minn. 402, 216 N.W.2d 641 (1974) (prospective
application only); State v. DeSantis, 65 N.J. 462, 323 A.2d 489 (1974) (prospective
application only); State v. Bryant, 285 N.C. 27, 203 S.E.2d 27, cert. denied, 491 U.S.
974 (1974); State v. Watkins, 262 S.C. 178, 203 S.E.2d 429 (1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S.
911 (1974); West v. State, 514 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974); State v. J-R Distribs.
Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 584, 512 P.2d 1049 (1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 949 (1974); State ex
rel. Chobot v. Circuit Court, 61 Wis. 2d 354, 212 N.W.2d 690 (1973).
In rejecting this proposed construction the McDonald court noted:
What the Commonwealth urges is not mere construction but wholesale
rewriting. The proposed construction is not even a possible meaning of the words
of the statute when used in their ordinary senses. It draws no support from either
surrounding language in the same statute.., or other statutes in pari materia

In the present case ... there are many possible specific definitions of
sexual conduct which might be permissible under the First Amendment and we
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5903(a) could not be constitutionally applied absent amendments to section
37
5903(b) specifically defining the proscribed activity.
The court used the same vagueness rationale to invalidate the equity
provision of section 5903.38 Since section 5903(h) permits the enjoining of
transactions in materials determined to be obscene only under the standards
cannot choose among them, in the absence of guidance from the General
Assembly, without intruding upon the legislative province.
464 Pa. at 450, 347 A.2d at 298-99 (emphasis supplied by the court).
The earlier adoption of the Memoirs test by the Pennsylvania courts
prevented the McDonald court from holding that the language defining obscenity in
section 5903(b), as construed prior to Miller, satisfied the Miller standard. Id. at
444-46, 347 A.2d at 296. See note 32 supra.This analysis, however, has been adopted
in some other jurisdictions. See, e.g., People v. Nissinoff, 43 Cal. App. 3d 1025, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 457 (1974); People v. Enskat, 33 Cal. App. 3d 900, 109 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1973), cert.
denied, 418 U.S. 937 (1974); Slaton v. Paris Adult Theatre I, 231 Ga. 312, 201 S.E.2d
456 (1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 939 (1974); State v. Harding, 114 N.H. 335, 320 A.2d
646 (1974) (may have modified construction sub silentio); People v. Heller, 33 N.Y.2d
314, 307 N.E.2d 805, 352 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1973) (may have modified construction sub
silentio); State ex rel. Keating v. A Motion Picture Film Entitled "Vixen," 35 Ohio St.
2d 215, 301 N.E.2d 880 (1973).
A number of these decisions are based on the premise that the requirement of
specifically defined sexual conduct added nothing to the prior test in light of the
requirement that a criminal statute give fair warning of the prohibited conduct. See,
e.g., Hall v. Commonwealth, 505 S.W.2d 166 (Ky. 1974); State ex rel. Wampler v. Bird,
499 S.W.2d 780 (Mo. 1973); State v. Little Art Corp., 191 Neb. 448, 215 N.W.2d 853
(1974); Price v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 490, 201 S.E.2d 798, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 902
(1974). The Pennsylvania court noted in McDonald that, in light of the Miller Court's
lengthy discussion concerning the requirement of a specific definition and the nature
of its examples of definitions which would satisfy that requirement, it could not be
assumed that this aspect of the Miller test was a nullity. 464 Pa. at 446 n.12, 347 A.2d
at 296 n.12, citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1973).
37. 464 Pa. at 452, 347 A.2d at 299. The vagueness rationale adopted by the
McDonald court had been used by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in two earlier
cases to invalidate related statutes. Commonwealth v. Burak, 232 Pa. Super. Ct. 499,
335 A.2d 820 (1975) (obscene exhibitions); Commonwealth v. Winkleman, 230 Pa.
Super. Ct. 265, 326 A.2d 496 (1974) (obscene exhibitions). See also Commonwealth v.
Krasner, 238 Pa. Super. Ct. 187, 357 A.2d 558 (1976); Commonwealth v. March, 238 Pa.
Super. Ct. 8, 352 A.2d 65 (1975); Commonwealth v. Kasner, 238 Pa. Super. Ct. 1, 352
A.2d 558 (1975).
In holding the existing statute unconstitutional under Miller, Pennsylvania
adopted an approach followed by a small number of jurisdictions. See, e.g., People v.
Tabron, 544 P.2d 372 (Colo. 1976); Mohney v. State, 261 Ind. 56, 300 N.E.2d 66 (1973);
State v. Wedelstedt, 213 N.W.2d 652 (Iowa 1973); State v. Shreveport News Agency,
287 So. 2d 464 (La. 1973); Commonwealth v. Horton, 365 Mass. 164, 310 N.E.2d 316
(1974); ABC Interstate Theatres, Inc. v. State, 352 So. 2d 123 (Miss. 1976); Art Theatre
Guild, Inc. v. State, 510 S.W.2d 258 (Tenn. 1974).
McDonald was subsequently reaffirmed. See Commonwealth v. Van Emburg,
467 Pa. 445, 359 A.2d 178 (1976); Commonwealth v. Evan, 467 Pa. 42, 354 A.2d 541
(1976).
38. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903(h) (Purdon 1973). Section 5903(h) provided:
The district attorney of any county in which any person sells, lends,
distributes, exhibits, gives away or shows, or is about to sell, lend, distribute,
exhibit, give away or show, or has in his possession with intent to sell, resell,
lend, distribute, exhibit, give away or show, any obscene literature, book,
magazine, pamphlet, newspaper, storypaper, paper, comic book, writing,
drawing, photograph, figure or image, or any written or pinted matter of an
obscene nature, or any article or instrument of an obscene nature, may institute
proceedings in equity in the court of common pleas of said county for the purpose
of enjoining the sale, resale, lending, distribution, exhibit, gift or show of such
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set forth in section 5903(b), the court held that no injunction could issue
under the Pennsylvania law in the absence of a constitutionally valid
39
definition of obscenity.
III.

PENNSYLVANIA'S LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE: THE 1977 AMENDMENTS

In response to the McDonald decision, the Pennsylvania General
Assembly passed a series of amendments to section 5903.40 Those
amendments, which further defined the offense of obscenity, 41 redefined the
term "obscene, ' 42 and provided a new statutory scheme for injunctive
relief,4 3 represented the legislature's attempt to conform to the United States
Supreme Court's mandates in the area of obscenity regulation.

A.

The Offense Defined

Section 5903(a), which defines the offense of obscenity, prohibits anyone
"knowing the obscene character of the materials involved" from displaying,

distributing to adults, manufacturing, or advertising the availability of,
obscene materials. 44 While the new version of section 5903(a) draws much of

obscene literature, book, magazine, pamphlet, newspaper, storypaper, paper,
comic book, writing, drawing, photograph, figure or image, or any written or
printed matter of an obscene nature, or any article or instrument of an obscene
nature, contrary to the provisions of this section, and for such purposes
jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon such courts. A preliminary injunction may
issue and a hearing thereafter be held thereon in conformity with the Rules of
Civil Procedure upon the averment of the district attorney that the sale, resale,
lending, distribution, exhibit, gift or show of such publication constitutes a
danger to the welfare or peace of the community. The district attorney shall not
be required to give bond.
Id.
39. 464 Pa. at 461-63, 347 A.2d at 304-05. McDonald served as the precedent for
later cases invalidating the granting of injunctive relief. See Zimmerman v. Philjon,
Inc., 470 Pa. 409, 368 A.2d 694 (1977); Ranck v. Bonal Enterprises, Inc., 467 Pa. 569,
359 A.2d 748 (1976).
40. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
41. Id. § 5903(a). For a further discussion of section 5903(a) as presently enacted,
see notes 44-56 and accompanying text infra.
42. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903(b) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979). For a full
discussion of section 5903(b) as presently enacted, see notes 57-61 and accompanying
text infra.
43. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903(g) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979). For a
further discussion of section 5903(g) as presently enacted, see notes 62-75 and
accompanying text infra.
44. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903(a) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979). Section
5903(a) now provides:
No person, knowing the obscene character of the materials involved, shall:
(1) display or cause to permit the display of any obscene materials in or on
any window, showcase, newsstand, display rack, billboard, display board,
viewing screen, motion picture screen, marquee or similar place in such manner
that the display is visible from any public street, highway, sidewalk, transportation facility or other public thoroughfare;
(2) sell, lend, distribute, exhibit, give away or show any obscene materials
to any person 17 years of age or older or offer to sell, lend, distribute, exhibit or
give away or show, or have in his possession with intent to sell, lend, distribute,
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its language from the prior statutory formulation, 45 three significant
changes have been made.
First, the amended statute adds the element of scienter by expressly
requiring that the accused know the obscene character of the material

exhibit or give away or show any obscene materials to any person 17 years of
age or older, or knowingly advertise any obscene materials in any manner;
(3) design, copy, draw, photograph, print, utter, publish or in any manner
manufacture or prepare any obscene materials;
(4) write, print, publish, utter or cause to be written, printed, published or
uttered any advertisement or notice of any kind giving information, directly or
indirectly, stating or purporting to state where, how, from whom, or by what
means any obscene materials can be purchased, obtained or had;
(5) hire, employ, use or permit any minor child to do or assist in doing any
act or thing mentioned in this subsection.
Id.
This section underwent substantial changes before it was passed by the
General Assembly. See 161 PA. LEGIS. J. S376 (daily ed. May 24, 1977). As originally
proposed, section 5903(a) would have included only subsection (1), prohibiting the
public display of obscene materials. Id. The manufacture, advertisement, or sale or
distribution to adults to obscene materials would thus not have been prohibited. Such
a formulation would have been in conformity with the recommendations of the
Commission on Obscenity and Pornography issued in a report formulated after two
years of extensive research. REPORT, supra note 18, at 51-62 & 65-67. This report
recommended the repeal of laws forbidding dissemination of explicit sexual material
to willing adult buyers, the enactment of laws forbidding commercial dissemination of
pictorial pornography (as explicitly defined) to children without parental consent, and
the adoption of "public display" and postal laws designed to protect unwilling viewers
from offensive and intrusive depictions of sexual activity. Id. These recommendations
were based on findings of a lack of a significant causal relationship between
pornography and antisocial behavior, a reasonably minor degree of public concern
about sexually explicit materials and their growing availability, and a possibly
beneficial effect of pornography as an outlet for those with potential antisocial
tendencies. SCHAUER, supra note 11, at 63. The report of the Commission was
characterized as "morally bankrupt" by President Nixon. N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1970, at
L-71. Thirteen days after the Report was issued, the United States Senate rejected it
by a vote of ninety-six to three. S. Rep. No. 477, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). It should
be noted that the Commission's recommendations concerning obscenity laws relating
to adults are now effective in six states. Three of these have repealed their adult
obscenity statutes. See MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-8-110 (Mont. Crim. Code 1973);
S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§22-24-27 to 22-24-54 (Supp. 1974). W. VA. CODE
§§ 61-8A-1 to 61-8A-7 (Cum. Supp. 1974). Three other states have enacted only child
obscenity statutes. For example, the Iowa Supreme Court held that the Iowa obscenity
statute violated current constitutional standards in State v. Wedelstedt, 213 N.W.2d
652 (Iowa 1973), and the Iowa legislature enacted only a child obscenity statute the
following year, apparently deciding against revising the adult statute to meet the new
constitutional standards. See IOWA CODE ANN. §§725.1-725.10 (West Cum. Supp.
1977). See also N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-50-1 to 40-50-8 (Supp. 1973); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, § 2802 (1974).
For a further discussion of the Commission's Report, see Barnett, Corruption
of Morals - The Underlying Issue of the PronographyCommission Report, 1971 L. &
Soc. ORDER 189 (1971); Clor, Science, Eros and the Law: A Critique of the Obscenity
Commission Report, 10 DUQ. L. REV. 63 (1971); Johnson, The PornographyReport:
Epistemology, Methodology and Ideology, 10 DUQ. L. REV. 190 (1971); Lockhart, The
Findings and Recommendations of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography:
A Case Study of the Role of Social Science in FormulatingPublic Policy, 24 OKLA. L.
REV. 209 (1971).
45. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903(a) (Purdon 1973). For the text of this section,
see note 31 supra.
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involved.46 "Knowing" is defined by the statute as "having general
knowledge of, or reason to know or a belief or ground for belief which
warrants further inspection or inquiry of, the character or content of any
material [described in section 5903(a)] which is reasonably susceptible of
examination by the defendant. ' 47 This "knowledge of the character of the
materials" test was approved by the United States Supreme Court in
Hamling v. United States,48 in which the Court held that a prosecution's
46. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903(a) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979). The
Supreme Court of the United States had previously held in Smith v. California, 361
U.S. 147 (1959), that obscenity statutes must incorporate at least some concept of
scienter. Id. at 150-52. Smith involved a city ordinance which made it a crime for a
bookseller to have obscene books on his premises, with no proof of knowledge on the
part of the bookseller required for a finding of criminal liability. Id. at 148-49. The
Court found that the concept of strict liability was unacceptable where the crime had
some relationship to freedom of speech. Id. at 151. To permit strict liability to be
imposed, the Court felt, would "chill" free speech since the bookseller would "tend to
restrict the books he sells to those he has inspected; and thus the State will have
imposed a restriction upon the distribution of constitutionally protected as well as
obscene literature." Id. at 153. It was felt that this, in turn, would restrict public access
to constitutionally protected reading matter and thus violate the heart of the concepts
underlying the first amendment. Id.
While the Court in Smith held that any criminal obscenity statute must
contain some element of scienter, it was careful to leave the exact boundaries of the
definition to the legislatures and the lower courts. Id. at 154-55. For the issues
involved in defining the exact nature of the scienter requirement in obscenity cases,
see notes 48 & 49 and accompanying text infra.
Earlier statutory formulations of section 5903(a) did not contain an express
scienter requirement. See note 31 supra. A number of Pennsylvania courts construing
the same or similar statutory language, however, concluded that the failure to
expressly require scienter as an element of the offense of obscenity was not fatal to
the statute. Commonwealth v. Evan, 63 Pa. D. & C.2d 722, 727-28 (1973), rev'd on
other grounds, 467 Pa. 42, 345 A.2d 541 (1976) (scienter implied); Commonwealth ex
rel. Davis v. Van Emburg, 35 Lehigh Co. L. J. 356, 365-68 (1973), rev'd on other
grounds, 464 Pa. 618, 347 A.2d 712 (1975) (scienter implied); Commonwealth v.
Burtnick, 86 York 133, 134-35 (1971); Commonwealth v. Mormando, 18 Bucks Co. L.
Rep. 151, 157 (1968) (indictments framed in statutory language); Commonwealth v.
Morton, 23 Camb. Co. L. J. 61, 71 (1959); Commonwealth v. Levan, 52 Berks 160,
164-65 (1959) (obscenity at common law required scienter); Commonwealth v. Fisher,
76 Montg. Co. L. R. 427, 431-32, 21 D. & C.2d 396, 398-99 (1959). See also
Commonwealth v. Amick, 223 Pa. Super. Ct. 237, 241 n.4, 298 A.2d 905, 908 n.4 (1972);
Smith v. Crumlish, 207 Pa. Super. Ct. 516, 524-25, 218 A.2d 596, 601 (1966).
47. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §5903(b) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
48. 418 U.S. 87 (1974). The issue of a defendant's intent in obscenity regulation
was first placed before the United States Supreme Court in 1896 in Rosen v. United
States, 161 U.S. 29 (1896). In Rosen, the Court was faced with the question of whether
a charge of mailing obscene material must be supported by evidence that a defendant
"knew or believed that such [material] could be properly or justly characterized as
obscene." Id. at 41. The Court rejected this contention, stating:
The inquiry under the statute is whether the paper charged to have been obscene,
lewd, and lascivious was in fact of that character, and if it was of that character
and was deposited in the mail by one who knew or had notice at the time of its
contents, the offense is complete, although the defendant himself did not regard
the paper as one that the statute forbade to be carried in the mails. Congress did
not intend that the question as to the character of the paper should depend upon
the opinion or belief of the person who, with knowledge or notice of its contents,
assumed the responsibility of putting it in the mails of the United States.
Id. at 41. In Hamling, the Court specifically reaffirmed Rosen to the effect that
"knowledge of the character of the materials" is sufficient, and that it need not be
shown that the defendant believed the material to be obscene. 418 U.S. at 119-20.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1978

11

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 5 [1978], Art. 5
1148

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 23

demonstration that a defendant had knowledge of the contents of the
nature of the
materials he distributed and that he knew the character and
49
materials was constitutionally sufficient to prove scienter.
The amended section also expressly prohibits the distribution of obscene
motion pictures,50 thereby codifying the judicial gloss to the old section
5903(a). The earlier formulation of section 5903(a) prohibited only the
showing of "any obscene ... photograph, figure or image," without
specifically mentioning motion pictures. 51 The McDonald court, however,
had held that motion pictures were "photographs" or "images" within the
meaning of section 5903(a),52 and the legislature adopted this definition in
53
the 1977 amendments.
Finally, the amendments to section 5903(a) place a ban upon the public
display of obscene materials.5 4 This subsection, designed to prevent
intrusive displays of obscenity where the public would be forced to view it, 55
was recommended by the federal Commission on Obscenity and Porno56
graphy.
B.

The Redefining of Obscenity

The most substantial change made by the amendments to the
Pennsylvania obscenity law occurred in section 5903(b), the statute's
definitional section. 57 Under the pre-amendment obscenity statute, the

49. 418 U.S. at 123.
50. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903(a)(1) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979). For the
text of this subsection, see note 44 supra. Section 5903(b) includes motion pictures in
the definition of "obscene materials." 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §5903(b) (Purdon
Cum. Supp. 1978-1979). For the text of this section, see text accompanying note 59
infra.
51. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903(a) (Purdon 1973). For the text of this section,
see note 31 supra.
52. 464 Pa. at 441-43, 347 A.2d at 294-95. The defendants in McDonald had
argued that the failure to make any specific reference to motion pictures in the list of
prohibited materials indicated a legislative intent to omit motion pictures from the
scope of the statute's prohibition. Id. at 441, 347 A.2d at 294. Defendants based their
argument on the fact that section 5903(c) of the statute, prohibiting the distribution of
obscene materials to minors, specifically mentioned motion pictures. Id. See 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903(c) (Purdon 1973).
53. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
54. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903(a)(1) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979). For the
text of this subsection, see note 44 supra. Section 5903(a)(1) prohibits the "display of
any obscene materials ... in such manner that the display is visible from any public
street, highway, sidewalk, transportation facility or other public thoroughfare." 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903(a)(1) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979). A transportation
facility is defined as "any conveyance, premises or place used for or in connection
with public passenger transportation, whether by air, rail, motor vehicle or any other
method including aircraft, watercraft, railroad cars, buses, and air, boat, railroad and
bus terminals and stations." Id. § 5903(b).
55. 161 PA. LEGIS. J. s377 (daily ed. May 24, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Hill). As
originally proposed, the amended section 5903(a) only contained subsection one,
prohibiting the public display of obscene materials. Id. See note 44 supra.
56. For a discussion of the Commission, its findings, and its recommendations,
see note 44 supra.
57. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §5903(b) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court defined obscenity in terms of the Roth
standard as interpreted by Memoirs.5 8 As a result of the 1977 amendments,
however, Pennsylvania now defines "obscene materials" as:
Any literature, including any book, magazine, pamphlet, newspaper,
storypaper, comic book or writing and any figure, visual representation, or image including any drawing, photograph, picture or motion
picture, if:
(1) the average person applying contemporary community standards would find that the subject matter taken as a whole appeals to the
prurient interest;
(2) the subject matter depicts or describes in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct of a type described in this section; and
(3) the subject matter, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, educational or scientific value. 9
The statute defines "community," for the purpose of applying "contemporary community standards," as the state of Pennsylvania. 60 "Sexual
conduct" is defined as "patently offensive representations or descriptions of
ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated, and patently
58. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903(b) (Purdon 1973). For a discussion of this
section and its interpretation by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, see note 32 and
accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the Roth test, see notes 17 & 18 and
accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the Memoirs standard, see note 25 and
accompanying text supra.
59. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903(b) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979). The origin
of this language is the United States Supreme Court's holding in Miller. See 413 U.S.
at 24. See generally notes 12-29 and accompanying text supra.
60. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903(b) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
Determination of the relevant community for the purpose of obscenity regulation has
posed difficulties. The phrase "contemporary community standards" was first used by
the Supreme Court in Roth. 354 U.S. at 489. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
This test was apparently designed to prevent the evaluation of obscenity from being
made on the basis of whether the material had an adverse effect on a "particularly
susceptible subclass" of the community. 354 U.S. at 488-89. The Roth Court, however,
did not specifically consider the issue of defining the relevant community. In Manual
Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962), Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Stewart
in a plurality opinion, stated that "a national standard of decency" was appropriate
in a federal action since the statute reached the entire United States, and that
therefore the relevant community for a federal prosecution would be the entire country
in the absence of congressional action setting a more local geographic standard. Id. at
488 (plurality opinion). In Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964), which dealt with a
state obscenity prosecution, Justice Brennan stated that the scope of constitutional
protection must be uniform throughout the country. Id. at 193-95 (plurality opinion).
To hold otherwise, Justice Brennan noted, would have a deterrent effect on the total
distribution of material which might be considered offensive in only a small part of
the country, as no distributor would risk the varying judicial determinations that
would result from a variable standard. Id. at 194 (plurality opinion). The majority of
lower courts which have faced the issue of national v. local standards after Jacobellis
have employed a national definition of "community." SCHAUER, supra note 11, at
119-20.
National standards were rejected in Miller, in which the Court found no error
in instructing a jury to apply the contemporary community standards of the relevant
state. 413 U.S. at 30-34. Chief Justice Burger argued that a national standard was
nonexistent, or, at best, not capable of determination. Id. Chief Justice Warren had
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offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory func61
tions and lewd exhibition of the genitals."'
C.

Equitable Remedies Against Obscenity

Pennsylvania's pre-amendnent obscenity statute provided for injunctive relief as a remedy in obscenity actions, 62 but McDonald invalidated the
applicable provision for want of a constitutionally acceptable definition of
obscenity.6 3 While the amendments redefining obscenity may be sufficient to
cure the constitutional infirmity, the 1977 amendments also made three
significant changes in the equity provisions of the Pennsylvania obscenity
6
law. 1

earlier expressed this same opinion in Jacobellis. 378 U.S. at 200-01 (Warren, C.J.,
dissenting).
While Miller held that the contemporary community standards, by which the
prurience and patent offensiveness of allegedly obscene materials were to be judged,
need not be national in scope, the Court did not specify what their scope should be;
Miller only upheld the use of a statewide standard. 413 U.S. at 30-34. While this issue
was subsequently discussed in Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974), and Hamling
v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974), the Court emphatically declined to define the
"community" whose standards were to be applied. 418 U.S. at 157; 418 U.S. at 103- 10.
A number of states, however, have relied on the acceptance by the Miller
Court of the concept of a statewide community, adopting statutes defining the
"community" in terms of a statewide standard. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 53(a)-193(a)(3) (West Cum. Supp. 1978); MASS. GEN. LAws. ANN. ch. 272, § 31 (West
Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §94-8-110(d)(2)(i) (Mont. Crim.

Code 1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.1(b)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977); S.D. COMPILED LAWS
ANN. §22-24-27(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. §39-3010(G) (1975); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2801(6)(B) (Cum. Supp. 1977). See also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 11-20(c) (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977) (degree of public acceptance of material in
state is admissible evidence).
61. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §5903(b) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979). This
definition of "sexual conduct" is based on the examples of specifically defined sexual
conduct posited by Chief Justice Burger in Miller. 413 U.S. at 25. Pennsylvania,
through legislative action, has accomplished what a significant number of jurisdictions had accomplished through judicial gloss. See note 36 and accompanying text
supra.
62. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903(h) (Purdon 1973). For the full text of this
section, see note 38 supra.
63. 464 Pa. at 461-63, 347 A.2d at 304-05. See notes 38 & 39 and accompanying
text supra.
64. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §5903(g) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979). Section
5903(g) provides:
The attorney for the Commonwealth may institute proceedings in equity in
the court of common pleas of the county in which any person violates or clearly

is about to violate this section for the purpose of enjoining such violation. The
court shall issue an injunction only after written notice and hearing and only
against the defendant to the action. The court shall hold a hearing within three
days after demand by the attorney for the Commonwealth, one of which days
must be a business day for the court, and a final decree shall be filed in the office
of the prothonotary within 24 hours after the close of the hearing. A written
memorandum supporting the decree shall be filed within five days of the filing of
the decree. The attorney for the Commonwealth shall prove the elements of the
violation beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant shall have the right to trial
by jury at the said hearing.
Id.
The right to a jury trial in the injunction proceeding was also ensured under
the prior statute. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903(i) (Purdon 1973). The United States
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Section 5903(g) now prohibits the issuance of an ex parte injunction65
Under the prior statute, a preliminary injunction could be issued without a
hearing, provided that the issuance of the injunction was in conformity with
the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. 66 Such practice, however, was
disapproved by the courts on constitutional grounds.6 7 The statute as
Supreme Court summarily rejected the right to a jury trial in civil obscenity
proceedings in Alexander v. Virginia, 413 U.S. 836 (1973). Persuasive arguments to
the contrary, based on the nature of the substantive obscenity standard set forth in
Miller, have been advanced. In Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957),
Justice Brennan argued that since the community established the standards under
substantive obscenity law, and a jury represents a cross section of the community, a
jury is "the necessary safeguard demanded by the freedoms of speech and press for
material which is not obscene." Id. at 448 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Miller Court
reemphasized the importance of the community and the local jury as the arbiter of
community values by rejecting a national obscenity standard. 413 U.S. 30-34.
Hamling further stressed the jury's role in discerning and applying community
standards. 418 U.S. at 103-08. See also McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669, 687-89
(1976) (Brennan, J., concurring). At least one state requires that obscenity injunctions
be tried by "advisory juries," with the trial court being bound by a jury verdict that
the material was not obscene. McNary v. Carlton, 527 S.W.2d 343, 347-48 (Mo. 1975).
65. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903(g) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
66. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §5903(h) (Purdon 1973). Rule 1531 of the
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant part:
(a) A court shall issue a preliminary or special injunction only after written
notice and hearing unless it appears to the satisfaction of the court that
immediate and irreparable injury will be sustained before notice can be given or
a hearing held, in which case the court may issue a preliminary or special
injunction without a hearing or without notice.
PA. R. Civ. P. 1531.
67. In Commonwealth v. Guild Theatre, Inc., 432 Pa. 378, 248 A.2d 45 (1968), a
district attorney was granted an ex parte injunction, with no record made of the
proceedings, to enjoin the showing of an allegedly obscene motion picture. Id. at 379,
248 A.2d at 46. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court vacated the injunction, stating:
The procedure followed in this case was shockingly defective in at least two
respects -

the hearing without notice ...

and the censorhip without provision

for a prompt judicial decision.
The hearing which transpired .

.

. was reminiscent of the Star Chamber

proceedings of yore. It was held ex parte, and no record was made of these
proceedings ....

[Ilt must be apparent that such practices must not be allowed

to continue.
Id. at 380-81, 248 A.2d at 47. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also held that the
exhibition of a motion picture could not be restrained on obscenity grounds absent a
statutory provision for a prompt, final judicial decision; a hearing alone within four
days of the issuance of the injunction was held insufficient. Id. at 382, 248 A.2d at 48.
See also Commonwealth ex rel. Davis v. Van Emberg, 464 Pa. 618, 620-623, 347 A.2d
712, 713-15 (1975).
In Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), the United States Supreme
Court ruled that a system of administrative licensing of motion pictures is
constitutional only if conducted pursuant to "procedural safeguards designed to
obviate the dangers of a censorship system."Id. at 58. The Court determined that a
constitutionally valid licensing scheme must assure a prompt judicial determination
of obscenity, place the burden of instituting judicial proceedings on the administrator,
and limit the duration of any restraint imposed prior to judicial involvement to that
required for brief preservation of the status quo. Id. at 58-59. Cf. Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67 (1972) (statute allowing plaintiff to replevy personal property in the
possession of another without notice is inconsistent with due process absent
extraordinary situation); Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S.
175 (1968) (invalidating ex parte injunction against racist rally on ground that rally
presented clear and present danger of violence).
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amended obviates such objections by permitting the issuance of an
68
injunction only after written notice and a hearing.
The amended statute also provides that the state must prove the
elements of the offense "beyond a reasonable doubt. '6 9 While normally a
civil plaintiff need only meet the lesser burden of proof of a preponderance of
the evidence, 70 this provision circumvents the dangers inherent in applying
a lesser burden of proof to obscenity cases. For instance, it has been noted
that application of the lesser standard endangers the dissemination of
constitutionally protected materials in that such materials will either be
erroneously suppressed 71 or kept out of circulation due to the possibility of
72
erroneous imposition of civil sanctions.
Finally, the res judicata and collateral estoppel effects of a finding of
obscenity in an equity proceeding are strictly limited by the terms of the
amended statute. The statute provides that an injunction shall issue only
against the defendant to the action sub judice,73 and therefore a determination that certain materials are obscene, and the resulting injunction, are
limited to the defendant at bar; the finding may not be used to obtain an
injunction against persons not parties to the original action. Section
5903(h)(3) also provides that the elements of a criminal prosecution for
enjoined activities "shall be determined de novo at the criminal proceeding
and findings made in the equity action shall not be binding in the criminal

68. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903(g) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
69. Id.
70. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE

LAW

OF EVIDENCE § 339 (2d ed. 1972).

71. McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669, 684 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
Justice Brennan wrote:
Inherent in all factfinding procedures is the potential for erroneous
judgments and, when First Amendment values are implicated, the selection of a
standard of proof of necessity implicates the relative constitutionalacceptability
of erroneous judgments. "There is always in litigation a margin of error,
representing error in factfinding, which both parties must take into account.
Where one party has at stake an interest of transcending value ... this margin
of error is reduced as to him by the process of placing on the other party the
burden ...

of persuading the factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of ...

[the

existence of the fact] beyond a reasonable doubt." In the civil adjudication of
obscenity vel non, the bookseller has at stake such an "interest of transcending
value" - protection of his right to disseminate and the public's right to receive
material protected by the First Amendment. Protection of those rights demands
that the factfinder be almost certain - convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the materials are not constitutionally immune from suppression.
Id., quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958) (emphasis supplied by the
Court). This danger of erroneous suppression, it was noted, is especially acute where
the civil proceeding and the restraint imposed operate as a prior restraint, since the
material may consequently never be available to the public and thus never face the
test of acceptance under prevailing community standards. 424 U.S. at 685.
72. 424 U.S. at 685-86 (Brennan, J., concurring).
73. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §5903(g) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
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proceedings. ' 74 A civil determination of obscenity vel non will thus not have
75
a preclusive effect on a later criminal prosecution.
IV.

UNCERTAINTY, DUAL SANCTIONS, AND THE NEED
FOR PRIOR ADJUDICATION

As noted above, the pre-Miller Pennsylvania obscenity statute was
invalidated because the definition of obscenity set forth therein was
unconstitutionally vague in that it failed to specifically define the types of
depictions or descriptions considered to be obscene.76 The Pennsylvania
legislature, attempting to remedy this shortcoming by conforming with
Miller, incorporated into the statutory language the examples of sexual
conduct that Chief Justice Burger stated would meet the specificity
requirement.7 7 It is submitted, however, that the Supreme Court's mandate
in Miller requires a more comprehensive reformulation, 7 and that the
amendments have done little to remove the chill of uncertainty from the
area of obscenity regulation as contemplated therein.

74. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903(h)(3) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979). This
statutory provision is in conformity with current constitutional standards. See
McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669 (1976). In McKinney, a prosecuting attorney,
pursuant to a state statutory procedure, brought an in rem equity action in state court
against four magazines and two other parties, seeking an adjudication of the
magazines' obscenity, which resulted in a decree that the magazines were obscene. Id.
670-72. Petitioner, a bookstall operator who had not been given notice of or made a
party to the equity proceeding, was officially notified of the decree concerning the
specific magazines. Id. at 672. After officers later brought one of the magazines from
petitioner's bookstall, he was charged with violating a criminal statute by selling
"mailable matter known . . .to have been judicially found to be obscene." Id. at
672-73. At petitioner's trial, which resulted in his conviction, later upheld on appeal,
petitioner was not allowed to have the issue of the magazine's obscenity presented to
the jurors, who were instructed that they were not to be concerned with determining
obscenity, but only with whether or not petitioner had sold material judicially
declared to be obscene. Id. at 673. The Supreme Court held that the Alabama
procedures, insofar as they precluded the petitioner from litigating the obscenity of
the magazine as a defense to his criminal prosecution, violated the first and
fourteenth amendments. Id. at 673-74.
75. Although the earlier civil action will not have a preclusive effect on a later
criminal prosecution, a civil judgment may lead to the imposition of punitive
sanctions in the later proceeding through other means. First, the civil judgment may
be admissible and relevant in a criminal trial to prove scienter - that the merchant
was aware of the nature of the materials in question. See generally MCCORMICK,
supra note 70, at § 318. Second, since the civil decision under the Pennsylvania statute
is an injunction, subsequent criminal prosecution does not prevent the state from also
punishing the defendant for contempt. See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 594 (1895). This
double sanction for the same conduct may not escape interdiction under the double
jeopardy clause. Rendleman, Civilizing Pronography: The Case for an Exclusive
Obscenity Nuisance Statute, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 509, 509-10 (1977).
76. 464 Pa. at 452, 347 A.2d at 299. See generally notes 33-39 and accompanying
text supra.
77. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903(b) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979); 413
U.S. at 25.
78. See text accompanying note 83 infra. See also note 23 and accompanying text
infra.
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While any determination of obscenity is of necessity a subjective one, 79
the definitions adopted by the legislature are themselves vague, replete with
subjective terms such as "ultimate sexual acts," "normal or perverted," and
"lewd."' While the legislature's adoption of the Miller examples conforms
with current constitutional doctrine concerning the requirement of a strictly
drawn statute,81 it is submitted that the legislature could have better
conformed with the spirit of the Miller specificity requirement by adopting
language specifically describing prohibited materials,8 2 rather than reiterat79. Lockhart, supra note 11, at 548.
80. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903(b) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979). In Paris

Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), Justice Brennan commented upon the
vagueness of the Miller examples:
Of course, the Court's restated Roth test does limit the definition of obscenity
to depictions of physical conduct and explicit sexual acts. And that limitation
may seem, at first glance, a welcome and clarifying addition to the RothMemoirs formula. But, just as the agreement in Roth on the abstract definition of
obscenity gave little hint of the extreme difficulty that was to follow in
attempting to apply that definition to specific material, the mere formulation of a
"physical conduct" test is no assurance that it can be applied with any greater
facility .... The Court surely demonstrates little sensitivity to its own
institutional problems, much less the other vagueness-related difficulties, in
establishing a system that requires us to consider whether a description of
human genitals is sufficiently "lewd" to deprive it of constitutional protection;
whether a sexual act is "ultimate"; whether the conduct depicted in materials
before us fits within one of the categories of conduct whose depiction the State
and Federal Governments have attempted to suppress; and a host of equally
pointless inquiries.
Id. at 99 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
81. In DeSalvo v. Codd, 386 F. Supp. 1293 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (three judge court), it
was held that when the Miller descriptions are embodied in a statute, the requisite
specificity exists. Id. at 1300. Other courts have judicially added these standards into
existing statutes, thus adding the necessary specificity by interpretation. See note 36
and accompanying text supra. This same method of judicial interpretation was
adopted by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Twelve 200-Ft. Reels
of Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973), a companion case to Miller. See note 29 supra. In Twelve
Reels, the Court indicated that it was prepared to define "obscene," "lewd,"

"lascivious," "filthy," "indecent," and "immoral" as being limited to the Miller
examples. Id. at 130 n.7. The Court has also specifically reaffirmed the validity of
§ 1461 of the Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1976) (mailing obscene or crime inciting
matters), against a vagueness challenge. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87,
110-16, (1974). In light of note 7 in Twelve Reels this judicial interpretation would also
apply to other federal obscenity statutes. SCHAUER, supra note 11, at 167 n.66. See also
United States v. Friedman, 506 F.2d 511, 514-15 (8th Cir. 1974).
82. Statutes containing greater degrees of specificity in their definitions of
prohibited material have been proposed or adopted. For instance, the Commission on
Obscenity and Pronography drafted, but did not recommend, an adult obscenity
statute which would have prohibited the dissemination of:
any material which is made up in whole or almost entirely of pictures or threedimensional representations of human sexual intercourse, masturbation, sodomy
(i.e. bestiality or oral or anal intercourse), direct physical stimulation of
unclothed genitals, or flagellation or torture in the context of a sexual
relationship, and which includes, as part of its depictions, depictions of sex
organs and their condition; provided that, material shall not be deemed to be
obscene if it has artistic, literary, historical, scientific, educational or other
similar social value (except that in the case of material with slight social value
that value shall not remove the material from the foregoing definition if that
value is so slight as to make it extremely improbable that the material will be
disseminated to any significant number of persons on the basis of that social
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ing examples which, in the Supreme Court's own language, were not
intended to serve as a proposed regulatory scheme for the states. 83
A second criticism of the statute involves its use of parallel sanctions,
since the availability of criminal and noncriminal remedies provides a
potential for prosecutorial harassment that could easily chill free expression.
Adding the civil injunction remedy to the prosecutorial arsenal provides
authorities with an additional means of focusing on particular distributors.8 4 Due to the availability of multiple remedies (zoning, building codes,
criminal liability, injunctions, seizures), the authorities may proceed in
separate actions under each available theory.85 Regardless of the outcome, a

value). Advertising and manner of distribution may be considered, where
relevant, in determining the obscenity of material for the purpose of this section.
REPORT, supra note 18, at 42 n.7. Furthermore, the Pennsylvania legislature was far
more specific in defining prohibited material with regard to minors. See 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5903(e) (Purdon 1973). This section of the law was left undisturbed by the
1977 amendments. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903(e) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
Finally, the Miller Court noted the Oregon obscenity statute as an example of
sufficiently specific legislation. 413 U.S. at 24 n.6. The Oregon law provides in
pertinent part:
(5) "Nudity" means uncovered, or less than opaquely covered, post-pubertal
human genitals, pubic areas, the post-pubertal human female breast below a
point immediately above the top of the areola, or the covered human male
genitals in a discernibly turgid state. For the purposes of this definition, a female
breast is considered uncovered if the nipple only or the nipple and the areola only
are covered.
(6) "obscene performance" means a play, motion picture, dance, show or
other presentation, whether pictures, animated or live, performed before an
audience and which in whole or in part depicts or reveals nudity, sexual conduct,
sexual excitement or sadomasochistic abuse, or which includes obscenities or
explicit verbal descriptions or narrative accounts of sexual conduct.
(7) "Obscenities" means those slang words currently generally rejected for
regular use in mixed society, that are used to refer to genitals, female breasts,
sexual conduct or excretory functions or products, either that have no other
meaning or that in context are clearly used for their bodily, sexual or excretory
meaning.
(9) "Sadomasochistic abuse" means flagellation or torture by or upon a
person who is nude or clad in undergarments or in revealing or bizarre costume,
or the condition of being fettered, bound or otherwise physically restrained on
the part of one so clothed.
(10) "Sexual conduct" means human masturbation, sexual intercourse, or
any touching of the genitals, pubic areas or buttocks of the human male or
female, or the breasts of the female, whether alone or between members of the
same or opposite sex or between humans and animals in an act for apparent
sexual stimulation or gratification.
(11) "Sexual excitement" means the condition of human male or female
genitals or the breasts of the female when in a state of sexual stimulation, or the
sensual experiences of humans engaging in or witnessing sexual conduct or
nudity.
OR. REV. STAT. § 167.060(5)-(7) & (9)-(11) (1971).
83. 413 U.S. at 25.
84. See Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance, 404 F. Supp. 33, 46-56 (S.D. Tex.
1975) (multiple seizures of film and projector constituted bad faith and harassment).
85. See LUewelyn v. Oakland County Prosecutor's Office, 402 F. Supp. 1379 (E.D.
Mich. 1975) (injunctions based on zoning ordinances, seizures and arrests).
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series of legal actions will burden the hapless distributor, and may result in
86
self-censorship or the financial destruction of a small business.
It is submitted that an amendment to the obscenity statute requiring an
equitable finding of obscenity prior to criminal prosecution would solve this
problem, 8 since this type of amendment would ease the inherent harshness
of the current statute by allowing obscenity to be determined without the
immediate threat of criminal sanctions.88 Additionally, such a determination would put the defendant on clear notice of the obscene nature of his
materials as well as settle any threshold question of the existence of
obscenity involved in any of the above noted remedies. The chilling effect of
unwarranted obscenity actions could thus be avoided.
It should be noted, however, that a complete ban on all criminal
prosecutions without a prior civil adjudication of obscenity might unnecessarily hamper the enforcement of, and encourage the disregard of, obscenity
laws by permitting the distribution of all sexually explicit materials,
regardless of their illegality, until the necessary procedures for obtaining an
injunction are met.8 9 The Commission on Obscenity and Pornography
therefore suggested that prior civil adjudication be required only when doubt
exists concerning the legal status of the material in question. 90 In its report,
the Commission offered a proposed statute which, after authorizing civil
actions for declaratory judgments of obscenitysl and mandating the use of
such judgments to support injunctions and to establish scienter in
subsequent criminal prosecutions, 92 provides:

86. Rendleman, supra note 75, at 509-10.

87. Lockhart, supra note 11, at 569-86. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.2 (Cum.
Supp. 1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2809 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (relating to printed
verbal material only under obscenity law limited to minors).
88. 413 U.S. at 43-44 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas has argued
persuasively that "until a civil proceeding has placed a tract beyond the pale, no
criminal prosecution should be sustained." Id. at 41 (Douglas, J., dissenting) Justice
Douglas also argued that "[t]o send men to jail for violating standards they cannot
understand, construe and apply is a monstrous thing to do in a Nation dedicated to
fair trials and due process." Id. at 43-44 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Ward v.
Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 777-82 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Smith v. United States,
431 U.S. 291, 317-21 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Marks v. United States, 430 U.S.
188, 198 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
Because of the in terrorem effect of criminal sanctions, a majority of the
United States Supreme Court has approved the use of prior civil procedures to
determine whether the material sought to be suppressed is protected by the first
amendment. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 55 (1973). The Court first
articulated the rationale behind the use of prior civil adjudications as follows:
Instead of requiring the bookseller to dread that the offer for sale of a book may,
without prior warning, subject him to a criminal prosecution with the hazard of
imprisonment, the civil procedure assures him that such consequences cannot
follow unless he ignores a court order specifically directed to him ....
Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 442 (1957). See also McKinney v.
Alabama, 424 U.S. 669, 683 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
89. Lockhart, supra note 11, at 570-71.
90. REPORT, supra note 18, at 63.
91. Id. at 68.
92. Id. at 68-69.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol23/iss5/5

20

Kopesky: Constitutional Law - Obscenity - 1977 Amendments to the Pennsylva

1977-19781

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

1157

[C]riminal prosecutions shall be brought prior to the obtaining of a
declaration . . . only in cases of material which is unquestionably

within the applicable definitional provision. In all other cases, the
provisions of this Act shall be used prior to prosecution, which shall not
be based upon conduct engaged in before notice of a declaration
obtained pursuant to this Act. Prosecutions brought contrary to this
subsection shall be dismissed by the trial court ....9
The Commission's proposal, it is submitted, functions best in conjunction with a definite standard of obscenity which can be applied to the
material in question with a minimum of subjective evaluation. Absent such
a standard, very few cases would be "unquestionably within the applicable
definitional provision." 94 The proposal nevertheless would eliminate a large
measure of the in terrorem effect of the current statute by curtailing criminal
prosecution whenever there is any reasonable belief that the material in
question may not be within the statutory definition of obscenity. Such a
statute, coupled with a clear statutory definition of obscenity, would
eliminate uncertainty and foster enforcement of obscenity regulation while
limiting instances of official harassment.
V.

CONCLUSION

Despite the imperfections discussed above, the Pennsylvania statute
does remove some of the difficulties associated with obscenity regulation.
For example, the legislature has gone beyond current constitutional limits in
providing for a right to a jury trial in civil proceedings involving obscenity 95
and in mandating that the elements in such proceedings be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.96 Furthermore, the adoption of the Miller "definitions" as
the statutory definition of "sexual conduct" does provide a slight degree of
specificity where none was present before. Since the legislature adopted the
Miller standards and examples verbatim, 97 it can be concluded that the
amended Pennsylvania law is within the current constitutional framework
governing obscenity regulation. 98
This focus on constitutionality, however, misconceives much of the
issue, for it suggests incorrectly that if a measure is constitutional it must
perforce be good. The Constitution sets boundaries beyond which a statute
may not go in interfering with individual rights, but it does not imply that
everything within those outer boundaries is socially desirable. 99 In recent
93. Id. at 69.
94. Id. See note 93 and accompanying text supra.
95. See note 64 supra.

96. See notes 69-72 and accompanying text supra.

97. See notes 23 & 59 and accompanying text supra.

98. See note 81 and accompanying text supra.
99. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in a compulsory flag salute case, framed the
issue in this manner:
Our constant preoccupation with the constitutionality of legislation rather than
with its wisdom tends to preoccupation of the American mind with a false value.
The tendency of focusing attention on constitutionality is to make constitutional-
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cases, the Court has endeavored to remind the states that they are free to
eliminate all controls if they so desire. 10°
The strong stand taken by the Pennsylvania legislature against obscene
materials and their distribution is particularly incongruous in light of the
eroding national consensus concerning the proper role of government in
controlling obscenity.' 0' While the prosecutions for obscenity continue, often
with widespread publicity, a majority of Americans have expressed a
surprising lack of concern over the increasing availability of sexually explicit
materials, 10 2 and distributors continue to enjoy the silent, but commercially
lucrative, support of a significant segment of the population. 103 Not
suprisingly, therefore, there is a growing conviction within the law that any
form of restriction on the availability of sexually explicit materials to
willing adult buyers is incompatible with the guarantees of the first
amendment. 0 4
John P. Kopesky
ity synonymous with wisdom, to regard a law as all right if it is constitutional.

Such an attitude is a great enemy of liberalism. Particularly in legislation

affecting freedom of thought and freedom of speech much which should offend a
free-spirited society is constitutional. Reliance for the most precious interests of
civilization, therefore, must be found outside of their vindication in courts of law.
Only a persistent positive translation of the faith of a free society into the
convictions and habits and actions of a community is the ultimate reliance
against unabated temptations to fetter the human spirit.
Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 670-71 (1943) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting).
100. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 64 (1973). The Court in Paris
wrote that "[t]he States, of course, may follow ... a 'laissez faire' policy and drop all
controls on commercialized obscenity, if that is what they prefer. . .

."

Id. In United

States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971), the Court agreed that the legislatures were
entirely free to conclude, if they wished, that the concepts involved in present
obscenity statutes are "so elusive and the laws so inherently unenforceable without
extravagant expenditures of time and effort by enforcement officers and the courts
that basic reassessment is not only wise but essential." Id. at 356-57.
101. Rendleman, supra note 75, at 509-10.
102. REPORT, supra note 18, at 352. With regard to the sexual materials which
adults may obtain, it is clear that American public opinion does not strongly favor
restricting such materials; a majority (almost 60%) believe that adults should be
permitted to read or view any explicit material they choose. Id. For a further
discussion of the Commission's findings, see note 44 supra.
103. REPORT, supra note 18, at 74. The Commission on Obscenity and Pornography estimated the total value of sexually explicit materials sold annually in the
United States to be between $537 million and $574 million. Id.
104. See, e.g., Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 676, 777-82 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669, 678 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring); Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 83-85 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Bloom v.
Municipal Court, 16 Cal. 3d 71, 86-100, 545 P.2d 229, 239-48, 127 Cal. Rptr. 317,
327-36 (1976) (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
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